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 We test whether induced mood states have an effect on elicited risk and time preferences. 
Risk preferences between subjects in the control, positive mood, and negative mood treatments 
are neither economically nor statistically significant. However, we find that subjects induced into 
a positive mood exhibit higher discount rates and that subjects under negative mood do not differ 
significantly with a control group. Results also suggest that irrespective of mood state, 
introducing a cognitively demanding task before risk preference elicitation increases risk 
aversion and females are less risk averse when in all-female sessions than when in mixed-gender 
sessions. 
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1. Introduction  
 In the beginning of the 20th century, economics was generally devoid of psychological 
concepts by basing economic theory on the principles of rational choice (see Bruni and Sugden 
2007 for a historical perspective). However, with the advent of “behavioral economics”, there 
has been considerable effort lately in bringing out psychological concepts in economics. Hence, 
economics and psychology no longer stand in complete isolation. Reviews of the fruitfulness of 
this interaction have appeared in core economic journals. For example, Elster (1998) brought out 
the interesting features of “emotions” in the development of economic theory and in explaining 
human behavior. 
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The literature in economics usually confounds emotions and mood in an almost 
indistinguishable way. However, there are stark differences between emotions and moods, as 
described in the psychology literature. Emotions tend to be extremely brief, lasting for a few 
seconds (Izard 1991; Larsen 2000) while moods typically last longer (Watson and Vaidya 2003). 
To quote the example provided in Watson and Vaidya (2003), the full emotion of anger might 
last for only a few seconds while an annoyed or irritable mood may persist for several hours or 
even for a few days. In essence, the concept of mood subsumes all subjective feeling states, not 
simply those experiences that accompany classical, prototypical emotions such as fear and anger 
(Watson and Vaidya 2003). Therefore, it appears that in order to explore all aspects of affective 
states on human behavior it would be necessary to go beyond the narrow boundaries of emotions 
by examining the much broader concept of mood. 
In this study, we examine the role of mood in joint elicitation of risk and time 
preferences. Studies in the literature that examine the role of mood on risk and time preferences 
have looked over only one of these dimensions but not both at the same time. The examination of 
risk and time preferences is important since they are fundamental economic preferences that 
have been found to influence many facets of economic decision-making and human behavior. 
For example, risk and time preferences have been shown to influence self-control problems that 
could lead to negative health outcomes (e.g., Fudenberg and Levine 2009; Benhabib and Bisin 
2005; Bernheim and Rangel 2004). 
The hypothesis that people tend to make judgments that are mood congruent, dates back 
to Johnson and Tversky (1983). Johnson and Tversky (1983) found that bad mood increased 
subjective probabilities of risk assessments while positive mood produced a comparable decrease 
in subjective probabilities. This hypothesis of mood congruent judgments implies that moods 
may affect preference formation by influencing judgments.  
In psychology, two models of decision making which relate mood states with risk-taking, 
predict the exact opposite things. One of these models is the Affect Infusion Model (AIM) which 
suggests that positive mood increases risk-taking behavior while negative mood reduces the 
tendency to take risks (Forgas 1995). This is because individuals in an elated mood rely on 
positive cues in making judgments and thus are more likely to think about the positive aspects of 
risky situations than those in a negative mood. The other model is the Mood Maintenance 
Hypothesis (MMH) which asserts that people in elated moods may not want to risk losing the 
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elated state and thus render themselves more risk averse (Isen and Patrick 1983). Hence, 
according to this model, people in negative moods will be willing to take more risk (be less risk 
averse) in order to obtain greater potential gains that may alter their mood upwards. Many 
studies in the literature have since then taken one side or the other. For example, Isen and Patrick 
(1983) found that subjects under positive affect were betting less chips (representing credit for 
participation) and also required a higher probability of winning as the minimum for taking the 
bet (Isen and Geva 1987).  
Much of the literature on mood and risk aversion appeared only over the last decade and 
most of these studies can be found not in the economics but in the psychology literature1. For 
example, Hockey et al. (2000) examined the effect of naturally occurring and induced negative 
moods (in particular anxiety, depression and fatigue) on risk in every day (hypothetical) decision 
making and found that fatigue was more strongly linked to increased riskiness. In another study, 
Hills et al. (2001) examined the effect of mood states in persistence (duration) in playing 
gambling games and found that negative moods had an inhibitory effect (which can be 
interpreted as less risk taking) but only for non-regular gamblers. Regular gamblers were 
completely unaffected. Similarly, Yuen and Lee (2003) found that people in induced depressed 
mood had lower willingness to take risk (where risk was defined based on hypothetical choices 
from everyday life dilemmas) than people in neutral and in positive mood and Williams et al. 
(2003) found that decision makers (managers) with high negative affect were more likely to 
avoid risk (as measured by hypothetical choices of actions to varied business scenarios). In a 
related study, Chou et al. (2007) reconfirmed that individuals in a negative mood are less willing 
to take up more risk (where risk was defined similar to Yuen and Lee 2003).  However, they 
found an asymmetric age effect, where positive mood affects risk taking only for older 
individuals. More recently, Kugler, Connolly, and Ordóñez (2010) found that the impact of 
prototypical emotions such as fear and anger is contingent on the type of the risk. They found 
that fearful participants were more risk-averse than angry participants in lottery-risk tasks but in 
tasks where risk was generated by another person’s uncertain behavior, fearful participants were 
less risk-averse than angry participants. 
Kim and Kanfer (2009) offered a bridge that addresses the inconsistencies between AIM 
and MMH by evaluating what they called “an integrative explanation”. Specifically, they  
                                                 
1 We only focus on the literature on mood and risk/time preferences for brevity and due to journal page restrictions. 
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showed that if a cognitive demanding task intervenes between negative mood induction and risk-
taking judgments (defined as choices over dilemmas) the observed trend reverts: subjects 
exhibited lower levels of risk-taking judgments (offering support for AIM) as opposed to higher 
levels of risk-taking when there is no intervening cognitive task (offering support for MMH). 
Grable and Roszkowski (2008) found that incidental positive mood was positively 
associated with having a higher level of financial risk tolerance (as measured on a financial risk 
tolerance scale). In a laboratory experiment, Helga et al. (2007) showed that incidental (not 
induced) good mood has a significant effect on the shape of the probability weighting function 
for women (but not men); that is, women weighed probabilities of gains and losses relatively 
more optimistically than men. In contrast, Walser and Eckel (2010) found no effect of mood on 
risk preferences. 
 As discussed above, although there have been a few studies in the literature that 
examined the relation between mood and risk preferences, there have been only two studies that 
explored the link between mood and time preferences. Specifically, McLeish and Oxoby (2007) 
found evidence that inducing subjects with negative mood results in greater impatience (i.e., 
increased discount rates) but only among women and Ifcher and Zarghamee (2010) found that 
mild positive affect significantly reduces time preference, that is, increases the present value of a 
future payment. 
In this study, we revisit the issue of determining the effect of mood states on risk and 
time preferences but in contrast to previous studies, we jointly elicit measures of risk and time 
preferences using a conventional lab experiment (according to the terminology of Harrison and 
List 2004).  This is an important topic that has not been examined in the literature since joint (as 
opposed to separate) elicitation of risk and time preferences could potentially provide a different 
set of results on mood effects than what has been found in previous studies that did not jointly 
elicit these preferences. Andersen et al. (2008) have shown that joint elicitation of risk and time 
preferences results in significantly different discount rates than separate elicitation. They then 
conclude that credible estimation of discount rates rely on the joint estimation of risk and time 
preferences.    
In addition to joint elicitation of risk and time preferences, we also utilize the statistical 
specification and theoretical framework of Andersen et al. (2008).  Moreover, unlike much of the 
previously cited literature (with the exception of McLeish and Oxoby 2007; Ifcher and 
 
6 
 
Zarghamee 2010; Walser and Eckel 2010; Helga et al. 2007; Hills et al. 2001), we use non-
hypothetical elicitation procedures and use real monetary incentives for recruitment and 
elicitation of risk and time preferences. We also explore if a cognitively demanding task right 
after mood inducement could affect risk preferences as suggested in the literature and whether 
there are gender differences in elicited risk and time preferences. 
To further assess the contribution of our study in the literature and be able to compare our 
findings with other studies, we developed a table (see Table A1 in the Appendix) that 
summarizes the relevant literature that relates mood states with risk or time preferences. From 
the 14 studies we identified, only five of them used real financial commitments to elicit risk or 
time preferences and none conducted joint elicitation of risk and time preferences. Of the five 
studies that used real financial commitments, one did not induce mood (Helga et al. 2007) but 
rather examined incidental moods and only one study (Walser and Eckel 2010) used validated 
scales from psychology to measure the success of the induction procedure (i.e., mood 
measurement). In terms of the employed risk and time preference tasks, our study uses similar 
procedures used in four out of these five studies (McLeish and Oxoby 2007; Ifcher and 
Zarghamee 2010; Walser and Eckel 2010; Helga et al. 2007). In terms of the results, one of the 
studies found no effect of mood (Walser and Eckel 2010), two of the studies found mood effects 
but only for women (McLeish and Oxoby 2007; Helga et al. 2007), one study found that a 
significant effect of mood holds only for a sub-sample (i.e, non-gamblers) (Hills et al. 2001) and 
only one of the studies found their results to hold across all subject groups (Ifcher and 
Zarghamee 2010). 
 In our study, although we find some differences in risk preferences between subjects in 
the control, positive mood, and negative mood treatments, these are not statistically significant 
similar to the results obtained by Walser and Eckel (2010). However, we find both economically 
and statistically significant effects of positive mood (but not of negative mood) on elicited 
discount rates. Specifically, in contrast to Ifcher and Zarghamee (2010), we find that positive 
mood induces higher discount rates. Our sample size is comparable to most of the above cited 
studies.  
In addition, we extend our design in two directions. First, we inserted a cognitively 
demanding task (preference reversals phase) in half of the sessions, following Kim and Kanfer 
(2009). Consistent with Kim and Kanfer (2009), our results suggest that subjects become more 
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risk averse when an intervention stage is used under a negative mood, offering support for the 
AIM. However, subjects become less risk averse when there is no intervening stage, offering 
support for the MMH. We also found that the intervening stage explanation of Kim and Kanfer 
(2009) does not hold under positive mood. We find that under positive mood subjects become 
more risk averse when a cognitively demanding task is intervened (which offers support for the 
MMH) but are less risk averse when the cognitively demanding task is not intervened (which 
offers support for the AIM). Hence, our results do not confirm the integrative intervening 
explanation of Kim and Kanfer (2009).  However, we note that their study did not use real 
monetary incentives. 
Secondly, we use our experiment to examine gender differences on choice under risk by 
employing gender-specific sessions and contrasting these with mixed gender sessions. We find 
evidence that a same-gender environment can alter elicited risk preferences (but not discount 
rates) for females (but not males). This effect holds irrespective of the induced mood state. 
In the next sections we describe in detail our experimental procedures, present the 
framework for the analysis and then the results and discussion. 
 
2. Experimental procedures 
The experiment we designed was part of a larger project on choice under risk that also 
involved a lottery choice task and a lottery auction task aimed at identifying preference reversals. 
In this paper, we used the preference reversal task as a cognitive intervening stage before risk 
elicitation to check if this intervening stage would make a difference in the measurement of risk 
preferences under different mood states as has been proposed in the literature (Kim and Kanfer 
2009). Following Andersen et al. (2008), the time preference task was placed at the very end of 
each session since it involved winning a considerable amount of money and we did not want to 
risk contaminating the previous tasks with income effects. Andersen et al. (2010) found in one of 
their treatments that there are no statistically or economically significant order effects in the risk 
and time preference tasks. Order effects are more likely to appear in situations where a similar 
task is repeated twice (or more) as in Harrison et al. (2005). Since our risk and time preference 
tasks both involve lotteries and might be considered similar, we presented them to subjects in 
alternating order between sessions.  
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Due to the widespread evidence of gender differences on choice under risk (e.g., Niederle 
and Vesterlund 2007; Gneezy, Leonard, and List 2009; Booth and Nolen 2009b, 2009a) we also 
tested whether risk and time preferences might be affected when we alter the environment of the 
session in terms of gender. Therefore, we conducted additional sessions with males only and 
females only. 
To minimize the number of sessions that we would need to run for the full design, we 
decided to induce different mood states to subjects in the same session. Given that our computer 
lab is equipped with private booths and no communication between subjects was aloud, we were 
certain that no mood contagion took place. Our mood inducement technique is described in detail 
below. 
Our full design involved six treatments in six sessions2. In the first two treatments we 
induced half of the subjects with positive mood and half of the subjects with negative mood. The 
only difference between the first two treatments was that the order of the preference reversals 
and risk preferences task were alternated. In treatments 3 and 4, our control treatments, mood 
was only measured and not induced. The order of the preference reversals and the risk 
preferences task was also alternated in these treatments. Treatments 5 and 6 were similar to 
treatment 1 except that subjects in these treatments were all females and males, respectively. 
Table 1 shows the experimental design. We only used one proctor or monitor (i.e., one of the 
authors) for all sessions. To isolate the role of mood and order of the tasks on risk and time 
preferences we first analyzed treatments 1 to 4 together and then analyzed treatments 1, 5, and 6 
together to explore gender differences in our data.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 In our very first session a couple of things went wrong which prompted us to rerun this session with a completely 
different set of subjects. First, one of the subjects could not keep himself quiet during the experiment although we 
pointed out the necessity of no communication. Improper behavior resulted in early termination of his participation 
in the session. In addition, a server failure resulted in having subjects wait for more than 10 minutes doing nothing. 
Since the necessary control was lost and given the sensitivity of our design to contaminating mood behavior, we 
decided to dismiss all data from this session. Therefore, in total we ran seven sessions, the seventh being a re-run of 
treatment one. We dismissed data from session 1 from all further analysis. 
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2.1. Description of the experiment 
The conventional lab experiment was conducted using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher 
2007).3 Subjects consisted of undergraduate students at the XXXX University (REMOVED FOR 
PEER REVIEW). During the recruitment, the nature of the experiment and the expected earnings 
were not mentioned. However, subjects were told that they will be given the chance to make 
more money during the experiment. Stochastic fees have been shown to be able to generate 
samples that are less risk averse than would otherwise have been observed (Harrison, Lau, and 
Rutström 2009). 
Each subject participated in only one of the treatments exhibited in Table 1. The size of 
the groups varied from 15 to 18 subjects per treatment. Each treatment lasted a little more than 
an hour. In total, 101 subjects participated in our experiments, which were conducted in March 
2010. This number does not include 15 subjects from session 1 that were dismissed from any 
further data analysis. We considered these data contaminated as noted in footnote 2. 
Each session consisted of different phases: the mood induction phase, the lottery choice 
phase, the lottery auction phase, the mood measurement phase, the risk preferences phase, the 
time preferences phase and the post-auction phase4. The lottery auction and choice phases are not 
part of the research agenda of this paper and will not be given further consideration. Subjects 
were given prior instructions on the overall layout of the session and were also reminded about 
the procedures at the beginning of each phase. Experimental instructions are available at the 
anonymous website https://sites.google.com/site/risktimemood/. 
 
2.2. The mood induction phase 
Mood induction procedures have been widely used by psychologists and have also been 
adopted by economists (e.g., Kirchsteiger, Rigotti, and Rustichini 2006; Capra 2004). Capra et 
al. (2010) give a brief summary of the different methods used in the psychology literature. In this 
study we used experience of success/failure as our mood induction procedure, similar to what 
                                                 
3 z-Tree is a software package designed to facilitate computer-based economic experiments. It has been used in 
numerous experiments as evident by the more than 1800 citations that the paper documenting the software has 
collected in Google scholar.  
4 We also measured the rate of preference reversals using lottery choice tasks and lottery auction tasks but since 
these phases are not part of this paper’s research focus, we are not giving a detailed discussion. Prior to the auction 
phase there was also significant training with the auction mechanism which included hypothetical as well as real 
auctions. These phases of the experiment are discussed in .....(REMOVED FOR PEER REVIEW). 
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was used in many other studies (Barone, Miniard, and Romeo 2000; Swinyard 1993, 2003; 
Capra 2004; Capra, Lanier, and Meer 2010; Hill and Ward 1989; Curtis 2006). Specifically, 
subjects in the mood induction treatments were given a MENSA test that had to be completed 
within 6 minutes. Half of the subjects received a 16-question hard MENSA test and half of the 
subjects received an easy MENSA test (the tests are available at 
https://sites.google.com/site/risktimemood/).   
The questions were first pretested in an online survey with a convenience sample using 
snowballing methods. Subjects were randomly exposed to one of the two versions. After taking 
the MENSA test, we then measured subjects’ moods (see next subsection). In the online hard 
version, the pretest subjects answered on average 4.5 questions correctly while in the online easy 
version, the pretest subjects answered 12.9 questions. Their scores were displayed right after the 
time to complete the test expired, along with a phrase stating that the average person between 18-
55 years old answers about 10 questions correctly, that 95% of the people answer at least 6 
questions correctly and that only 5% answer more than 12 questions correctly. Given subjects’ 
scores in the two versions, this feedback immediately placed the average subject in the hard 
version to the low 5% of the population while the average subject in the easy version was placed 
at the top 5%. This way subjects in the hard version experienced failure and subjects in the easy 
version experienced success. In a sample of 49 subjects in the online pretest, the two versions of 
the test were adequate in inducing different levels of positive affect (the null of equal scores on 
the positive affect scale was highly rejected on a t-test with a p-value of 0.02). 
While the procedure we discussed above is not new, has been validated, and has been 
used in several other studies (e.g., Swinyard 1993; Barone, Miniard, and Romeo 2000; Swinyard 
2003), we wish to discuss the inducement method further since provision of false feedback on 
subject’s performance can be considered a form of deception. On a more pragmatic basis, this 
would be a problem if subjects were participating repeatedly  in experiments since they would 
then develop a general expectation of deception (Hertwig and Ortmann 2001). However, all our 
subjects were naive subjects i.e., they have never participated before in an economic experiment 
or a survey organized by this university. In addition, it is necessary to involve some deception 
when inducing moods since the use of a carefully designed theatrical display is needed (Baron 
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2001)5. Deception, however, makes it more difficult for future experimenters to induce subjects 
into believing in their stories. We are however not too concerned about this issue given that our 
lab policy is for subjects to participate in an economic experiment only once. In informal 
individual debriefings, we also asked our subjects what they thought about the various phases of 
the experiment and none of them mentioned the mood induction phase. Also, none of the authors 
was a professor of any of the subjects, which otherwise may have prevented students from 
stating their true state of mind regarding the procedures followed in the session. In our 
experiments, we informed all our subjects that the purpose of the test was to test their cognitive 
skills. Hence, subjects did not associate our mood inducement procedures as a form of deception. 
Moreover, since we did not want subjects to associate different phases of the experiment and put 
the picture together, they were also told that the experiment they are participating in consists of 
sub-experiments that are not necessarily tied to each other. Subjects that answered the hard 
version of the test, scored significantly lower in the positive affect scale (discussed in the next 
paragraph). There was no significant difference between subjects with respect to the negative 
affect scale. 
 
2.3. The mood measurement phase 
To find ways to measure mood, we turned to the psychology literature for guidance. 
Watson and Vaidya  (2003) provided a comprehensive overview of the dimensionality of the 
mood construct as well as on ways to measure its dimensions. Mood is usually depicted as a 
circular scheme with four bipolar dimensions that are spaced 45 degrees apart. The positive 
affect and negative affect dimensions are considered the most important measures of the higher 
order dimension.  
The PANAS scale (Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule; which was later subsumed 
into the PANAS-X)  (Watson 1988) emerged as the standard measure of these constructs and has 
been widely used in the literature (Pocheptsova and Novemsky 2010; Bono and Ilies 2006; 
Pelled and Xin 1999; de Ruyter and Bloemer 1998; Pugh 2001). The terms comprising the 
                                                 
5 Another method for inducing moods is the use of film clips.  However, an important limitation of the use of films 
is that there are no widely accepted sets of mood eliciting film stimuli, not to mention the challenge of finding film 
stimuli for culturally different or non-English speaking subjects. Also, use of film clips is still a form of deception 
since subjects are not told that films clips are shown to induce their moods. Subjects are instead told that they will be 
evaluating the films. 
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PANAS-X Positive Affect scale are active, alert, attentive, determined, enthusiastic, excited, 
inspired, interested, proud, and strong; the items included in the Negative Affect scale are 
afraid, ashamed, distressed, guilty, hostile, irritable, jittery, nervous, scared, and upset. Subjects 
rated the extent to which they experienced each term right after inducement on a 5-point scale (1 
= very slightly or not at all, 5 = extremely). In the lab the order of appearance of these terms was 
completely randomized. The scale has been thoroughly tested for reliability and validity (see 
Watson and Vaidya 2003). 
 
2.4. The risk preferences phase  
To elicit risk preferences we used the multiple price list (MPL) design devised by Holt 
and Laury (2002). In this design each subject is presented with a choice between two lotteries, A 
or B as illustrated in Table 2. In the first row the subject is asked to make a choice between 
lottery A, which offers a 10% chance of receiving €2 and a 90% chance of receiving €1.6, and 
lottery B, which offers a 10% chance of receiving €3.85 and a 90% chance of receiving €0.1. 
The expected value of lottery A is €1.64 while for lottery B it is €0.475, which results in a 
difference of €1.17 between the expected values of the lotteries. Proceeding down the table to the 
last row, the expected values of the lotteries increase but increases much faster for lottery B. 
For each row, a subject chooses A or B and one row is then randomly selected as binding 
for the payout.6 The last row is a simple test of whether subjects understood the instructions 
correctly. A risk neutral subject should switch from lottery A to lottery B at the 5th row. In our 
experiments subjects undertook three risk aversion tasks: they made choices fromError! Reference 
source not found. Table 2 (the 1x table), a table where payoffs were scaled up by 10 (the 10x table) 
and a table similar to Table 2 but without the last three rows (the 1x-framed table). The order of 
appearance of the tables for each subject was completely randomized to avoid order effects 
(Harrison et al. 2005). The 10x table served as an elicitation vehicle of risk when larger payoffs 
are involved while the 1x-framed table was used as an alternate format since subjects could be 
drawn in the middle of the ordered table irrespective of their true value (Andersen et al. 2007). 
One of these tables was chosen at the end as binding for the payout. Thus, to infer risk 
preferences, subjects were asked to provide 27 binary choices from the risk preference task.  
                                                 
6 In every step that involved random drawings by the computer, we reassured subjects that the drawing was fair and 
that extra care was taken by the programmer to make sure that this is the case. 
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2.5. The time preferences phase  
The experimental design for measuring discount rates is based on the experiments of 
Coller and Williams (1999), Harrison, Lau, and Williams (2002) and Andersen et al. (2008). 
Subjects are confronted with payoff  tables similar to Table 3 and made choices from three tables 
with different time horizons: the 3-month time horizon table (Table 3), the 6-month time horizon 
table (payment option B pays in 7 months) and the 12-month time horizon table (payment option 
B pays in 13 months). At the end of the experiment only one table and one row were randomly 
drawn as binding. Financial constraints precluded us from paying every single subject in each 
session and hence only one subject was randomly drawn as the winner. 
In Table 3Table, option A offers 300 € in 1 month and option B offers 300 € +x € in 4 
months, where x ranged from annual interests rates of 5% to 50% on the principal of 300 €, 
compounded semi-annualy to be consistent with national banking practices on savings accounts. 
The table also includes the anual and annual effective interest rates to facilitate comparisons 
between lab and field investments (Andersen et al. 2008). The tasks provided two future income 
options instead of one instant and one future option. This front-end delay on the early payment 
has two advantages: it holds the transaction costs of future options constant (see Coller and 
Williams 1999 for a discussion) and it avoids the passion for the present that decision makers 
exhibit when offered monetary amounts today or in the future. Future payments were guaranteed 
by means of a postdated check with a national bank serving as the third party guarantee. Thus 
subjects provided 30 binary choices for the time preference task that are used to infer time 
preferences. 
 
2.6. The post-auction phase 
Subjects provided information about their age, household size and income. Experimental 
instructions are available at https://sites.google.com/site/risktimemood/. 
 
3. Identification of risk and time preferences 
 The identification of risk and time preferences follows closely the framework of Andersen et 
al. (2008), so we will only repeat the basic information here. Andersen et al. (2008) discussed in 
detail how to put parametric structure on the identification of risk and time preferences, the 
theoretical issues involved, and the statistical specification. 
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 Let the utility function be the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) specification7: 
  1
1
rMU M
r

          (1) 
for r≠1, where r is the CRRA coefficient. In (1), r=0 denotes risk neutral behavior, r>0 denotes 
risk aversion behavior and r<0 denotes risk loving behavior. 
 In addition, if we assume that Expected Utility Theory (EUT) holds for the choices over 
risky alternatives and that discounting is exponential then the subject is indifferent between two 
income options tM  and tM  if and only if: 
     
1
1
t tU M U M           (2) 
where  tU M  is the utility of monetary outcome tM  for delivery at time t ,  is the discount 
rate,   is the horizon for delivery of the later monetary outcome at time t  , and the utility 
function is separable and stationary over time.  is the discount rate that equalizes the present 
value of the two monetary outcomes in the indifference condition (2). 
The binary choices of the subjects in the risk preference tasks can be explained by 
different CRRA coefficients. For example, a subject that made four safe choices (i.e., choosing 
option A) and then switched to option B would have revealed a CRRA interval of -0.15 to 0.4. 
The intervals are reported in Table 2. Similarly, the binary choices in the time preference tasks 
can be explained by different discount rates. A subject that chose 300 € in 1 month would have 
                                                 
7 One may argue that the risk aversion tasks are done over a different prize domain than the discount rate tasks. This 
would cause no problem for the assumption of the CRRA function, given that risk aversion is then constant. It would 
pose a problem however, if other forms are assumed. To allow for the possibility that the relative risk aversion is not 
constant we also tried a more flexible functional form by adapting the hybrid expo-power function of Saha (1993). 
The expo-power function can be defined as     11 exp ru M aM a   , where M is income and a  and r  are 
parameters to be estimated. Relative risk aversion (RRA) is then   11 rr a r M   . 
Given that the model did not converge for the joint estimation of risk and time preferences, we then estimated the 
model for risk aversion only. We allowed each parameter r  and a  to be a separate linear function of the control 
variables that are used in latter estimations. The estimates indicate that there is no statistically significant deviation 
in a  from zero for any of the variables controlled for, or for the constant. We can therefore conclude that there is no 
evidence to reject CRRA as a general characterization for this specific sample and this income domain. Similar 
conclusions were drawn in Harrison, Lau and Rutstrom (2007). 
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revealed a discount rate higher than  /300 100%x  ; otherwise she would have revealed an annual 
discount rate of  /300 100%x   or less8. 
Andersen et al. (2008) explicitly write the likelihood function for the choices that subjects 
make in these tasks and jointly estimate the risk parameter r and the discount rate . The 
contribution to the overall likelihood from the risk aversion responses can be written for each 
lottery i as: 
    
1,2
i j j
j
EU p M U M

   (3) 
where  jp M  are the probabilities for each outcome jM  that are induced by the experimenter 
(i.e., columns 1, 3, 5 and 7 in Table 2). To specify the likelihoods conditional on the model, a 
stochastic specification from Holt and Laury (2002) is used. The expected utility (EU) for each 
lottery pair is calculated for candidate estimate of r and the ratio: 
1
1 1
B
A B
EUEU
EU EU

     (4) 
is then calculated where AEU  and BEU  refer to options A and B respectively, and   is a 
structural noise parameter. The index in (4) is linked to observed choices by specifying that the 
option B is chosen when 12EU  . 
The conditional log-likelihood can then be written as: 
        ln , ; , ln | 1 ln 1 | 1RA i i
i
L r y EU y EU y       X  (5) 
where  1 1iy    denotes the choice of the option B (A) lottery in the risk preference task i. 
The conditional log-likelihood for the time preference task can be written in a similar 
manner if we write the discounted utility of each option as: 
1
1
r
A
A
MPV
r

    and    
11
11
r
B
B
MPV
r

     (6) 
and the index of the present values as: 
                                                 
8 The fact that the whole experiment was computerized allowed us to impose monotonic preferences (i.e., subjects 
could only switch once to option B and could not go back and forth). We did not allow for indifference between A 
and B choices either. Subjects had to clearly state whether they preferred option A or B. 
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1
1 1
B
A B
PVPV
PV PV

           (7) 
where   is a noise parameter for the discount rate tasks. The log-likelihood will then be: 
        ln , , ; , ln | 1 ln 1 | 1DR i i
i
L r y PV y PV y        X  (8) 
and the joint likelihood will be: 
     ln , , , ; , ln , ; , ln , , ; ,RA DRL r y L r y L r y      X X X   (9) 
Each parameter in equation (9) can be allowed to be a linear function of treatment effects. 
Equation (9) can be maximized using standard numerical methods. We used the routines made 
available as a supplemental material in Andersen et al. (2008). For a more thorough and 
pedagogical treatise on maximum likelihood estimation of utility functions, see Appendix F in 
Harrison and Rutstrom (2008). The statistical specification also takes into account the multiple 
responses given by the same subject and allows for correlation between responses.  
 
4. Estimation and results 
Each subject in our experiment responded to 57 binary tasks (27 for the risk preference 
tasks and 30 for the time preference tasks). Data from subjects that chose lottery A over the last 
row of Table 2 were dismissed since this is a sign that they failed to comprehend the task. 
Therefore, 15 subjects were further dropped which resulted in a sample size of 86 subjects, with 
2322 risk aversion choices and 2580 discount rate choices.  As mentioned previously, since this 
paper has a twofold goal, we first analyze treatments 1 to 4 together and then examine treatments 
1, 5 and 6. 
 
4.1. Was the mood induction successful? 
 Figure 1 displays kernel density estimates of the affect scores for positive and negative 
affect respectively. The vertical lines depict mean estimates of the scores per treatment. 
 Remember that a hard MENSA test aims to induce a negative mood to subjects and an easy 
MENSA test aims to induce a positive mood state through experience of failure and success, 
respectively. We are certain that our subjects experienced success or failure given that those 
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exposed to the easy MENSA test in the lab answered on average 12.9 questions correctly (out of 
16) while those exposed to the hard MENSA test answered only about 6 questions correctly.  
 It is obvious from panel A that the density function of positive affect for those exposed to 
the hard MENSA test is slightly shifted to the left implying lower scores for those exposed to the 
hard test. The density function of those exposed to the easy test has a slightly larger peak but is 
otherwise very close to the density function of the control group. One could tell a similar story 
based on the means (vertical lines) of the positive affect scores across treatments. 
 Panel B shows that both densities associated with the negative affect scores of those exposed 
to the easy and hard test are shifted right with respect to the control group. The density function 
of those exposed to the hard test is slightly more to the right but is practically indistinguishable 
from the density function of those exposed to an easy test. Comparing the means just reconfirms 
the above. 
These results also hold up in a regression context. We run separate regressions for the 
positive affect and negative affect scales which are depicted in Table 4. The list of covariates 
includes dummies for those exposed to the easy and hard MENSA tests (the control treatments, 
where mood was not induced, serve as the base category). We used demographic variables as 
additional control variables. Variable description is exhibited in Table 5. 
 Results are in agreement with Figure 1. Subjects that were exposed to a hard test scored 
significantly lower (by almost 4 points) in the positive affect scale compared to subjects in a 
control group and those who took the easy test. No statistically significant differences are 
observed between those answering an easy test and those in the control group and the magnitude 
of the difference in the scores is negligible. In all, it seems that our mood induction procedure 
was able to induce lower levels of positive affect to those that took the hard test. 
 On the other hand, both the easy and hard tests induced higher negative affect with respect 
to the control group by as much as 5 points, which is also evident in Figure 1 where both density 
functions are shifted to the right. The Hard coefficient is larger than the Easy coefficient by one 
point (i.e., those exposed to a hard test had on average higher levels of negative affect) although 
their difference is not statistically significant. So why did both procedures induce higher negative 
affect? One explanation could be that the quiz-type procedure resembles exams that associate 
negatively with students’ mood e.g., test anxiety. It is also important to remember that positive 
affect and negative affect are two dimensions of mood that can co-exist. The overall conclusion 
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is that subjects that took the hard test had lower positive affect than subjects that took the easy 
test and there was no statistically significant difference in their negative affect level. They also 
exhibited less positive affect and higher negative affect than the control group.  
 
4.2. Risk aversion and discount rates under induced mood states 
We first analyze data from treatments 1 to 4 to examine whether mood states can affect 
risk and time preference elicitation. Also, since we alternated the order of the preference reversal 
task and the risk preference task after mood inducement, we are able to test the AIM vs. MMH 
issue; that is, examine the effect of an intervening cognitive demanding task before risk 
elicitation. Kim and Kanfer (2009) found that this procedure makes a significant difference when 
evaluating risk-taking judgments. 
Table 5 exhibits the maximum likelihood estimates of risk and time preferences. We 
allowed the   and r  parameters of equation (9) to be linear functions of treatment effects. One 
could in principle allow several variables to enter the linear specification of   and r  but this 
comes at the cost of convergence, at least with our data. Given our random assignment to 
treatments we can safely assume that our effects are causal. There are also no significant 
differences in the socio-demographic profile of our subjects between the treatments. We used 
chi-square and Fischer’s exact tests to check the variables depicted in Table 4 (t-tests were used 
for the continuous variables like age and household size). None of the differences was 
statistically significant. 
Panel A presents maximum likelihood estimates allowing for risk aversion (joint 
estimation of risk and time preferences) and Panel B shows the corresponding estimates when 
assuming risk neutrality9. What is evident at first glance is that joint elicitation of risk and time 
preferences results in much lower discount rates, which is exactly what motivated the study of 
Andersen et al. (2008). For example, one of the estimates drops sharply from about 89.4% to 
13.8%. 
                                                 
9 Note that some confidence intervals for   include a negative lower bound. This is because we imposed 0   by 
allowing non-linear transforms of the parameters to be estimated. This allowed the Stata program to maximize over 
some unconstrained variable and to constrain the underlying parameter to be non-negative and non-zero. Table 4 
presents standard errors and confidence intervals that are transformed back using the Delta method (see Oehlert 
1992) which is an approximation.  
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The results in panel A show two things. The first one reconfirms Kim and Kanfer’s 
(2009) “integrative explanation” in the sense that when a cognitively demanding task (i.e., 
preference reversal in our case) is introduced before risk elicitation, the subjects under negative 
mood become more risk averse. This is evident from the higher risk aversion rates in the upper 
part of panel A. The differences are statistically significant across mood states with a p-value of 
0.024. However, this is also true for subjects under positive mood. Based on the integrative 
intervening explanation of Kim and Kanfer (2009) one would expect the exact opposite results 
for positive mood. Our results therefore question the intervening stage explanation offered by 
Kim and Kanfer (2009) which was based on the use of hypothetical elicitation of risk and time 
preferences.   
The fact that subjects that had an intervening task just before risk elicitation are more risk 
averse, has a direct effect on discount rates. It implies that subjects have more concave utility 
functions and thus lower discount rates. This is evident when comparing the top and bottom parts 
of panel A for discount rates. Although these differences look stark, they are not statistically 
significant given the dispersions. We get p-values in the range of 0.43 to 0.52 when testing 
whether the observed differences are statistically different from zero. 
The second thing that is evident in Table 5  is that positive mood induces a 4.8% to 6.4% 
higher discount rate than the control treatment depending on whether a cognitive demanding task 
was introduced before risk elicitation. The difference is significantly different from zero with a 
p-value of 0.049 and 0.068, respectively.  On the other hand, negative mood induces marginally 
lower discount rates than the control treatment but the difference is neither economically nor 
statistically significant.  It is interesting to note that in the risk neutral case (panel B), the 
differences in discount rates between treatments are stark although not statistically significantly 
different from zero. The effect of negative mood is significantly different from the effect in the 
control treatment in contrast to results under risk neutrality. One would then incorrectly infer 
from the risk neutral estimates that mood does not have a statistically significant effect on 
discount rates or that negative mood has an economically significant effect. Both of these results 
do not hold when risk aversion is allowed.   
Table 7 shows the estimates when considering an alternative discounting function, 
namely a hyperbolic discounting function. As discussed in Andersen et al. (2008), the use of the 
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quasi-hyperbolic specification is not possible due to the existence of a front end delay in our 
tasks. One would then need to replace (6) with: 
1
1
r
A
A
MPV
r

    and    
11
1 1
r
B
B
MPV
r

      (10) 
for 0  . Qualitatively, we get similar results for the hyperbolic discounting model and 
quantitatively, we get slightly larger estimated discount rates and slightly lower CRRA 
coefficients. Overall, we find that mood has no effect on CRRA coefficients but that positive 
induced mood results in higher discount rates. We also find that having a cognitively demanding 
task preceding risk elicitation results in higher CRRA coefficients; that is subjects become more 
risk averse irrespective of the mood state. 
 
4.3. Risk aversion, discount rates and mood: Are there gender differences? 
 To test for gender differences on choice under risk, we ran gender-specific sessions 
represented by Treatments 5 and 6 in Table 1. We did not alternate the order of the tasks as done 
in Treatments 1 to 4, since we have tested and demonstrated this effect in the previous section. 
To explore for gender differences, we compared Treatments 1, 5 and 6 and used the data from 
these treatments only. Table 8 and Table 9 show the maximum likelihood estimates from these 
treatments using exponential and hyperbolic discounting respectively10. We allowed the  ,   
and r  parameters of equation (9) to be linear functions of treatment effects (namely the Positive, 
FemTreat and MaleTreat variables; remember there is no control treatment for these data) and 
gender. 
 The general observation that joint elicitation of risk and time preferences results in lower 
discount rates and that hyperbolic discounting leads to slightly higher discount rate estimates and 
slightly lower CRRA coefficients, holds with these data as well. With respect to the CRRA 
estimates we find that subjects under positive mood are less risk averse than subjects under 
negative mood by approximately 7 points. However, the difference is not statistically 
significantly different from zero at conventional statistical levels (p-value=0.324 and 0.291 for 
the exponential and hyperbolic discounting models respectively). We can also observe that 
                                                 
10 These represent results using the entire sample of Treatments 1, 5 and 6 using dummies (i.e., not using 
subsamples). 
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discount rates elicited under positive mood are higher than discount rates elicited under negative 
mood. Although we cannot reject the null of a zero difference, the null is marginally not rejected 
in some cases (p-value=0.110 and 0.117 for the exponential and hyperbolic discounting models 
respectively). 
 Interesting differences come up when comparing between the gender-specific sessions and 
the mixed-gender session. In the gender specific sessions, the CRRA coefficients are practically 
identical in the only-males session and the only-females session. However, when examining for 
differences between the mixed and the gender-specific sessions, males (females) appear to be 
more (less) risk averse in the gender-specific session than in the mixed sessions. We reject the 
hypothesis that females in the mixed sessions provided the same CRRA coefficient as the 
females in the gender-specific session (p-value=0.003 and 0.002 for the exponential and 
hyperbolic discounting models respectively) but not for males. Thus it appears that females are 
significantly less risk averse in the gender-specific sessions and this effect is consistent across 
mood states i.e., either positive or negative mood. 
 With respect to the discount rates, it is obvious that discount rates elicited from gender-
specific sessions and mixed sessions both for males and females do not differ in terms of 
economic significance. For example, we elicit a discount rate of 22.7% (13.9%) for males under 
positive (negative) mood in the gender-specific session and a rate of 20.1% (12.3%) for males in 
the mixed session. The differences are not statistically significant either in any of the comparison 
groups. Note that in the risk neutral case one would have wrongly assumed that there are 
economically significant gender differences. For example the elicited discount rate for males 
under positive mood in the gender-specific session (77.9%) is almost double the discount rate 
elicited in the mixed session (41.5%). 
 
5. Conclusions 
Our objective in this study is to assess the effect of mood states on risk and time 
preferences.  Our paper differs from previous studies in two important ways.  First, we jointly 
elicited measures of risk and time preferences. Credible estimates of risk and time preferences 
have been found to rely on the joint estimation of risk and time preferences (Andersen et al. 
2008). Yet, none of the previous studies jointly elicited these preferences when examining mood 
effects. Second, a vast majority of the studies that examined whether risk or time preferences can 
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be affected by mood states was conducted in hypothetical contexts. We conducted our risk and 
time elicitation tasks non-hypothetically. Our results generally suggest that moods do not affect 
risk aversion coefficients, consistent with Walser and Eckel (2010). However, we found ample 
evidence that positive mood positively affects discount rates. This result is in contrast to Ifcher 
and Zarghamee (2010) that found that mild positive affect significantly increased the present 
value of a future payment. This finding seemed surprising at first, given the many similarities in 
the experimental procedures followed (e.g., paid for recruitment, real elicitation context, student 
sample etc.) in their study and ours. However, Ifcher and Zarghamee (2010) did not consider the 
simultaneous determination of risk and time preferences. Thus, they implicitly assumed risk 
neutrality in eliciting time preferences. While we cannot be completely certain that this is the 
reason for the difference in the results between our study and theirs, we can offer some hints 
based on some of our estimates. Specifically, we found economically significant differences 
between the negative induced mood and control treatments when risk neutrality is assumed (see 
panel B, Table 6 and Table 7) but these differences disappeared when we allowed for risk 
aversion (see panel A, Table 6 and Table 7). This result reflects the importance of the joint 
elicitation of risk and time preferences.  
Given the increasing attention that economists are putting on examination of affect on 
risk and time preferences, future research should be cognizant of the role and the importance of 
joint and non-hypothetical elicitation of risk and time preferences.  Future research should also 
test the robustness of our findings and examine the reasons why positive mood would increase 
discount rates or time preferences.  It is possible that positive mood may substitute for income 
today (Ifcher and Zarghamee 2010).  Hence, subjects in the positive mood would require less 
money today to be indifferent to more money in the future.  It is also possible that positive mood 
enhances current levels of happiness (Lyubomirsky, King, and Diener 2005; Diener and 
Seligman 2004) and that current happiness makes people think less about the future; hence, the 
increase in time preference when under positive mood.   
Considering the robust finding in the literature of the general effect of risk and time 
preferences on human behavior and health outcomes (e.g., Fudenberg and Levine 2009; 
Benhabib and Bisin 2005; Bernheim and Rangel 2004), the issue examined in our study has 
significant implications for assessment of the potential mechanisms through which risk and time 
preferences affect behavior and health outcomes. Our study also generally reinforces the 
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argument offered in Ifcher and Zarghamee (2010) that affect should be neutralized before 
elicitation of time preferences since uncontrolled affect may be partially responsible for the wide 
range of time preference values estimated in past time preference studies. This issue is important 
in economics considering the large literature devoted to estimating and analyzing time 
preferences. 
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6. Appendix 
Table A1. Literature on mood and risk and time preferences 
Study Paid 
for 
particip
ation? 
Elicitation 
context (real 
vs. 
hypothetical) 
Type of 
sample 
Was 
mood 
induced
? (Yes, 
No) 
How was mood 
induced? 
Type of 
mood 
induced 
(Positive, 
negative, 
neutral) 
Mood 
measurement 
How were risk or 
time preferences 
elicited? 
Did the study find 
significant 
association with 
mood? 
(Johnson 
and 
Tversky 
1983) 
Yes Hypothetical Recruited 
from 
university’s 
newspaper, 
probably 
students 
Yes By having 
subjects read 
stories 
Negative, 
positive 
affect, 
neutral 
9-point scale 
anchored by 
negative-
positive 
Were asked to 
estimate the risk 
(probability) for a list 
of death causes 
Negative (positive) 
mood increased 
(decreased) 
subjective 
probability of death 
causes 
(Isen and 
Patrick 
1983) 
No Study 1: non-
financial 
participation 
course credit 
Study 2: 
Hypothetical 
Students Yes By unexpected 
gift 
Positive 
affect, 
neutral 
NA Study 1: bets on a 
roulette with varying 
chances of winning 
Study 2: Likelihood 
of taking the chance 
(1-10 scale) in 
hypothetical 
dilemmas of varying 
risk level 
Study 1: Positive 
mood decreased bets 
(level of risk) 
Study 2: No effect  
(Isen and 
Geva 1987) 
No non-financial 
participation 
Students Yes By unexpected 
gift 
Positive, 
neutral 
NA Subjects indicated 
minimum probability 
of winning for taking 
Positive mood 
increased minimum 
level of probability 
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course credit the bet on a roulette 
with varying chances 
of winning 
of winning for 
taking the bet 
(Hockey et 
al. 2000) 
No Hypothetical Study 1, 2: 
Students 
 
Study 3: 
Young 
management 
trainees of a 
chemical 
company1 
Study 1, 
2: No 
 
Study 3: 
Yes 
Study 1, 2: 
incidental 
moods (not 
induced) 
 
Study 3: by 
giving a set of 
demanding 
tasks as part of 
the coursework 
Study 3: 
negative 
mood 
(increased 
fatigue) 
Mood diary 
for 3 times a 
day for 14  
days (28 days 
in Study 2, 3 
weeks in 
Study 3). 12 
adjectives 
measured 
anxiety, 
depression and 
fatigue 
Choice between 13 
hypothetical 
dilemmas with one 
safe and one risky 
choice each, score of 
riskiness 
Fatigue more 
strongly correlated 
with higher riskiness 
(Hills et al. 
2001) 
Yes Real Students Yes By showing 10 
minute videos 
Positive, 
negative, 
neutral 
By placing a 
mark on a 10-
cm bipolar 
visual 
analogue scale 
with the words 
sad and happy 
at either end 
Number of trials 
subjects played in a 
computerized 
gambling game 
(subjects could stop at 
their own choice) 
Negative mood 
decreased number of 
trials played in the 
gambling game 
(which can be 
interpreted as less 
risk taking) for non-
regular gamblers 
only. No effect for 
regular gamblers. 
 
26 
 
(Yuen and 
Lee 2003) 
 
NA Hypothetical Students 
 
Yes By showing 22-
26  minute 
videos 
Positive, 
negative, 
neutral 
By a 4-item 11 
point likert 
scale 
(anchored by 
unpleasant–
pleasant, 
tense–relax, 
tiresome–
energetic, 
anxious-calm) 
Choice between 3 
hypothetical 
dilemmas with one 
safe and one risky 
choice each 
Positive (negative) 
mood increased 
(decreased) risk 
taking tendency. 
(Chou, Lee, 
and Ho 
2007) 
Members of 
community 
and youth 
centers 
Negative mood 
decreased risk 
taking tendency. 
Positive mood 
increased risk taking 
for older but not 
younger people. 
(Williams, 
Zainuba, 
and 
Jackson 
2003) 
No Hypothetical Company 
managers 
No NA NA A 14 item 
precursor of 
the PANAS 
scale 
Self-reported 
likelihood of 
choosing each of a 
number of business 
risk scenarios 
Negative affect 
decreased risk 
taking. 
(Helga et 
al. 2007) 
Yes Real Students No NA NA On a 6 likert 
scale anchored 
by bad-very 
good 
Choices between 
lotteries and certainty 
payoffs 
Women in positive 
mood (and not men) 
weigh probabilities 
more optimistically. 
(Grable and 
Roszkowsk
i 2008) 
No Hypothetical Non-students No NA NA Self-
evaluation to 
either happy, 
neutral or 
gloomy.  
A 13-item risk-
tolerance scale was 
used 
Positive mood was 
associated with 
higher level of risk 
tolerance. 
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(Walser 
and Eckel 
2010) 
Yes Real Recruited 
from 
university’s 
movie 
theater, 
probably 
students 
Yes By showing  
movies in a 
movie theater 
Whatever 
the movie 
induced 
(subjects 
self-selected 
to attending 
the movie) 
Several: 
PANAS scale, 
10-point likert 
scale anchored 
by bad-good 
mood 
Choices between 
lotteries and certainty 
payoffs 
No significant effect 
(Kim and 
Kanfer 
2009) 
No Hypothetical Students Yes By showing an 
8 minute video 
Negative 20 item 
PANAS scale 
Choice between 10 
hypothetical 
dilemmas in the form 
provided by 
Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) 
Negative mood 
increased risk-taking 
in one task but 
reduced risk-taking 
when a cognitive 
demanding task 
preceded risk 
elicitation. 
(McLeish 
and Oxoby 
2007) 
Yes Real Students Yes Combinining 
feedback 
(success/failure) 
and gifts 
Positive, 
negative, 
neutral 
No Choices between sum 
of moneys in different 
payout periods 
Negative mood 
increases discount 
rate but only for 
women 
(Ifcher and 
Zarghamee 
2010) 
Yes Real Students Yes By showing 
short video 
clips 
Positive, 
neutral 
Subjects were 
asked whether 
the film made 
them happier, 
sad or neither 
Subjects were asked 
to state the amount of 
money they preferred 
today to make them 
indifferent to another 
amount of money in 
Positive affect 
reduces time 
preference 
(increases the 
present value of a 
future payment) 
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the future 
1 The trainees participated in two successive five-day professional development courses and in one sense can be considered students. 
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Table 1. Experimental design 
Treatments Mood inducement Subject pool Order of Tasks 
1 Yes, Positive-Negative Mixed Preference Reversals – Risk Preferences 
2 Yes, Positive-Negative Mixed Risk Preferences – Preference Reversals 
3 No Mixed Preference Reversals – Risk Preferences 
4 No Mixed Risk Preferences – Preference Reversals 
5 Yes, Positive-Negative Females Preference Reversals – Risk Preferences 
6 Yes, Positive-Negative Males Preference Reversals – Risk Preferences 
 
Table 2. Sample payoff matrix in the risk aversion experiments 
Lottery A 
 
Lottery B 
EVA (€) EVB (€) Difference (€) 
Open CRRA 
interval if subject 
switches to 
Lottery B and 
background 
consumption=0
p € p € p € p € 
0.1 2 0.9 1.6  0.1 3.85 0.9 0.1 1.640 0.475 1.17 -∞ -1.71 
0.2 2 0.8 1.6  0.2 3.85 0.8 0.1 1.680 0.850 0.83 -1.71 -0.95 
0.3 2 0.7 1.6  0.3 3.85 0.7 0.1 1.720 1.225 0.50 -0.95 -0.49 
0.4 2 0.6 1.6  0.4 3.85 0.6 0.1 1.760 1.600 0.16 -0.49 -0.15 
0.5 2 0.5 1.6  0.5 3.85 0.5 0.1 1.800 1.975 -0.18 -0.15 0.14 
0.6 2 0.4 1.6  0.6 3.85 0.4 0.1 1.840 2.350 -0.51 0.14 0.41 
0.7 2 0.3 1.6  0.7 3.85 0.3 0.1 1.880 2.725 -0.85 0.41 0.68 
0.8 2 0.2 1.6  0.8 3.85 0.2 0.1 1.920 3.100 -1.18 0.68 0.97 
0.9 2 0.1 1.6  0.9 3.85 0.1 0.1 1.960 3.475 -1.52 0.97 1.37 
1 2 0 1.6  1 3.85 0 0.1 2.000 3.850 -1.85 1.37 +∞ 
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Note: Last four columns showing expected values and implied CRRA intervals were not shown 
to subjects. 
Table 3. Payoff table for 3 month horizon in discount rate experiments 
Payoff alternative 
Payment option A 
in € 
(Pays amount 
below in 1 month)
Payment option B 
in € 
(Pays amount 
below in 4 months)
Annual interest 
rate in % 
Annual 
effective 
interest rate in 
% 
1 300 304 5 3.4 
2 300 308 10 6.8 
3 300 311 15 10.1 
4 300 315 20 13.5 
5 300 319 25 16.9 
6 300 323 30 20.3 
7 300 326 35 23.6 
8 300 330 40 27.0 
9 300 334 45 30.4 
10 300 338 50 33.8 
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Table 4. Regression results for positive and negative affect 
Positive affect Negative affect 
Coef. Std.Error Coef. Std.Error
Constant 43.577** 17.847 45.698*** 13.765 
Easy 0.549 1.711 3.917*** 1.319 
Hard -3.776** 1.703 5.013*** 1.313 
Age -0.078 0.944 -1.796** 0.728 
Gender 0.566 1.394 2.277** 1.075 
Hsize -0.187 0.671 -0.325 0.518 
Educ2 -1.287 2.485 0.908 1.916 
Educ3 -3.092 2.756 3.779* 2.126 
Educ4 -2.239 3.858 5.124* 2.976 
Educ5 -1.917 4.926 7.057* 3.799 
Income2 -4.826 2.990 1.320 2.306 
Income3 -5.018 3.187 3.394 2.458 
Income4 -0.334 3.164 0.387 2.440 
R-squared 0.187 0.254 
Adj. R-
squared 
0.076 0.153 
Note: ***, **, * = Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level.   
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Table 5. Variable description 
Variable Variable description Mean SD 
Age Subject's Age 20.523 1.636
Gender Dummy, 1=male 0.442 0.500
Hsize Household size 4.279 1.059
Educ1* Dummy, 1st year student 0.221 0.417
Educ2 Dummy, 2nd year student 0.128 0.336
Educ3 Dummy, 3rd year student 0.349 0.479
Educ4 Dummy, 4th year student 0.186 0.391
Educ5 Dummy, 5th year student 0.116 0.322
Income1* 
Dummy, Ηousehold's economic position is good, very 
good or above average 0.070 0.256
Income2 Dummy, Ηousehold's economic position is average 0.512 0.503
Income3 Dummy, Ηousehold's economic position is below average 0.221 0.417
Income4 Dummy, Ηousehold's economic position is bad or very bad 0.198 0.401
Positive 
(Hard) 
Dummy, Subject is induced into positive mood (exposed to 
hard MENSA test) 0.384 0.489
Negative 
(Easy) 
Dummy, Subject is induced into negative mood (exposed 
to easy MENSA test) 0.349 0.479
Control* Dummy, Subject's mood is not induced 0.267 0.445
Order Dummy, Preference reversal task is conducted first 0.686 0.467
FemTreat Dummy, only females in the session 0.186 0.391
MaleTreat Dummy, only males in the session 0.198 0.401
Mixed* Dummy, mixed gender sessions 0.616 0.489
* Removed for estimation purposes. 
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Table 6. Estimates of risk and time preferences assuming exponential discounting 
 CRRA coefficient (r)  Individual discount rate () 
 
Estimate 
Std. 
Error 
Lower 
95% CI
Upper 
95% CI
 
Estimate
Std. 
Error 
Lower 
95% CI
Upper 
95% CI 
 A. Allowing a concave utility function (risk aversion) 
Risk 
preferences 
elicited 
after 
intervening 
stage 
Positive mood 0.796 0.058 0.682 0.909  0.138 0.054 0.032 0.245 
Negative mood 0.874 0.062 0.753 0.996  0.087 0.039 0.012 0.163 
Control Treatment 0.883 0.093 0.699 1.066 
 
0.090 0.045 0.003 0.177 
Risk 
preferences 
elicited 
right after 
inducement 
Positive mood 0.612 0.095 0.426 0.798  0.175 0.053 0.072 0.279 
Negative mood 0.690 0.115 0.465 0.915  0.111 0.060 -0.007 0.228 
Control Treatment 0.699 0.123 0.457 0.941 
 
0.114 0.047 0.022 0.207 
   
0.085 0.021 0.044 0.126  
   
 0.033 0.011 0.011 0.056 
 B. Assuming a linear utility function (risk neutrality) 
Risk 
preferences 
elicited 
after 
intervening 
stage 
Positive mood  0.894 0.307 0.292 1.496 
Negative mood  0.556 0.193 0.178 0.934 
Control Treatment 
 
0.681 0.195 0.299 1.063 
Risk 
preferences 
elicited 
Positive mood  0.658 0.180 0.305 1.011 
Negative mood  0.409 0.161 0.094 0.724 
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right after 
inducement 
Control Treatment 
 
0.502 0.126 0.255 0.748 
 
  
 0.148 0.035 0.080 0.216 
 
 
Table 7. Estimates of risk and time preferences assuming hyperbolic discounting 
 CRRA coefficient (r)  Individual discount rate () 
 
Estimate 
Std. 
Error 
Lower 
95% CI
Upper 
95% CI
 
Estimate
Std. 
Error 
Lower 
95% CI
Upper 
95% CI 
 A. Allowing a concave utility function (risk aversion) 
Risk 
preferences 
elicited 
after 
intervening 
stage 
Positive mood 0.788 0.063 0.665 0.911  0.146 0.060 0.028 0.264 
Negative mood 0.868 0.065 0.740 0.996  0.092 0.041 0.012 0.172 
Control Treatment 0.876 0.104 0.671 1.081 
 
0.095 0.050 -0.002 0.193 
Risk 
preferences 
elicited 
right after 
inducement 
Positive mood 0.597 0.092 0.416 0.778  0.184 0.054 0.077 0.291 
Negative mood 0.677 0.114 0.453 0.902  0.116 0.063 -0.007 0.239 
Control Treatment 0.685 0.126 0.438 0.931 
 
0.120 0.050 0.023 0.217 
   
0.088 0.022 0.045 0.130  
   
 0.035 0.012 0.012 0.058 
 B. Assuming a linear utility function (risk neutrality) 
Risk 
preferences 
elicited 
after 
Positive mood  0.931 0.341 0.263 1.600 
Negative mood  0.574 0.208 0.166 0.981 
Control Treatment  0.704 0.218 0.276 1.131 
 
38 
 
intervening 
stage 
Risk 
preferences 
elicited 
right after 
inducement 
Positive mood  0.682 0.198 0.293 1.071 
Negative mood  0.420 0.173 0.081 0.759 
Control Treatment 
 
0.515 0.136 0.249 0.782 
 
  
 0.149 0.038 0.075 0.223 
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Table 8. Estimates of risk and time preferences assuming exponential discounting (gender 
differences) 
Type of 
session CRRA coefficient (r)  Individual discount rate () 
Estimate 
Std. 
Error 
Lower 
95% CI
Upper 
95% CI  
Estimate
Std. 
Error 
Lower 
95% CI
Upper 
95% CI 
 A. Allowing a concave utility function (risk aversion) 
Males only 
Positive mood 0.603 0.195 0.222 0.984  0.227 0.098 0.035 0.420 
Negative mood 0.672 0.179 0.320 1.024  0.139 0.085 -0.028 0.307 
Females 
only 
Positive mood 0.600 0.084 0.435 0.764  0.266 0.090 0.090 0.442 
Negative mood 0.669 0.073 0.526 0.812  0.163 0.062 0.042 0.284 
Mixed 
session 
Positive mood-Males 0.436 0.104 0.231 0.640  0.201 0.091 0.022 0.380 
Negative mood-Males 0.505 0.100 0.309 0.700  0.123 0.053 0.020 0.226 
Positive mood-
Females 0.813 0.053 0.710 0.917 
 
0.276 0.138 0.006 0.547 
Negative mood-
Females 0.882 0.075 0.735 1.030 
 
0.169 0.109 -0.045 0.383 
   
0.086 0.020 0.047 0.126  
   
 0.060 0.021 0.019 0.101 
 B. Assuming a linear utility function (risk neutrality) 
Males only 
Positive mood  0.779 0.319 0.153 1.405 
Negative mood  0.508 0.198 0.119 0.896 
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Females 
only 
Positive mood  0.906 0.394 0.133 1.679 
Negative mood  0.590 0.203 0.193 0.987 
Mixed 
session 
Positive mood-Males  0.415 0.277 -0.128 0.959 
Negative mood-Males  0.271 0.151 -0.024 0.566 
Positive mood-
Females 
 
1.352 0.691 -0.003 2.707 
Negative mood-
Females 
 
0.881 0.439 0.020 1.742 
 
  
 0.184 0.045 0.096 0.273 
 
 
Table 9. Estimates of risk and time preferences assuming hyperbolic discounting (gender 
differences) 
Type of 
session 
CRRA coefficient (r)  Individual discount rate () 
Estimate 
Std. 
Error 
Lower 
95% CI
Upper 
95% CI
 
Estimate
Std. 
Error 
Lower 
95% CI
Upper 
95% CI 
 A. Allowing a concave utility function (risk aversion) 
Males only 
Positive mood 0.580 0.174 0.239 0.921  0.246 0.100 0.051 0.441 
Negative mood 0.655 0.161 0.338 0.971  0.148 0.085 -0.018 0.315 
Females 
only 
Positive mood 0.584 0.080 0.428 0.740  0.288 0.105 0.083 0.493 
Negative mood 0.658 0.071 0.520 0.797  0.174 0.065 0.046 0.302 
Mixed 
session 
Positive mood-Males 0.427 0.102 0.226 0.627  0.208 0.099 0.013 0.402 
Negative mood-Males 0.502 0.099 0.308 0.695  0.125 0.054 0.019 0.232 
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Positive mood-
Females 0.805 0.052 0.702 0.908 
 
0.302 0.153 0.001 0.602 
Negative mood-
Females 0.880 0.076 0.730 1.029 
 
0.182 0.116 -0.044 0.408 
   
0.088 0.019 0.050 0.126  
   
 0.064 0.022 0.021 0.106 
 B. Assuming a linear utility function (risk neutrality) 
Males only 
Positive mood  0.843 0.401 0.056 1.629 
Negative mood  0.530 0.227 0.084 0.975 
Females 
only 
Positive mood  1.017 0.541 -0.043 2.077 
Negative mood  0.639 0.259 0.131 1.148 
Mixed 
session 
Positive mood-Males  0.435 0.315 -0.182 1.051 
Negative mood-Males  0.273 0.161 -0.042 0.588 
Positive mood-
Females 
 
1.511 0.864 -0.183 3.205 
Negative mood-
Females 
 
0.949 0.500 -0.031 1.929 
 
  
 0.193 0.060 0.077 0.310 
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Figure 1. Kernel density estimates for affect scores 
 
